000016588 001__ 16588
000016588 037__ $$aUTEXAS:2152/8952
000016588 041__ $$aeng
000016588 245__ $$aElite Settlements
000016588 260__ $$c1987
000016588 500__ $$a
000016588 520__ $$aFollowing the classical elite theorists' injunction to study
variations in elite structure, we examine the elite
settlement as a major, yet largely overlooked, form of
political change. Elite settlements consist of broad
compromises among previously warring elite factions,
resulting in political stability and thus providing a
necessary precondition for representative democracy. To
identify the common features of elite settlements, we draw
upon four historie cases: England in 1688-1689, Sweden in
1809, Colombia in 1957-1958, and Venezuela in 1958. We
conclude by arguing for the extraction of elite settlements
from their current embeddedness in such concepts as
"bourgeois revolutions" and "democratic transitions," and we
advocate greater attention to the elite paradigm in efforts
to explain macropolitical outcomes.
000016588 65017 $$aPolitics
000016588 6557_ $$aWorking Paper
000016588 7860_ $$nTexas Papers on Latin America;87-01
000016588 8564_ $$uhttp://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/8952$$zUTEXAS:2152/8952
000016588 909C0 $$Y
000016588 909C4 $$dhttp://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/handle/2152/8952$$pUTEXAS:2152/8952
000016588 980__ $$aUTEXAS